"All people of broad, strong sense have an instinctive repugnance to the men of maxims; because such people early discern that the mysterious complexity of our life is not to be embraced by maxims, and that to lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is to repress all the divine promptings and inspirations that spring from growing insight and sympathy."
I. Introduction
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is commonly viewed either as a mechanical tool for making decisions or as a failed technique of decision-making that avoids moral, interactive, and ethical components. It is properly neither. Benefit-cost analysis is an art form that can produce useful information with the potential to improve decision-making.
To understand this we must consider current criticisms and come around to another way of looking at BCA.
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Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is widely seen as such a maxim as men create: a mere equation for deciding issues of fundamental values. It is seen as a rule by which preferences and emotions are valued, yet how can a maxim encompass these? It is hardly surprising then that BCA is the object of longstanding and expansive contumely and even
repugnance. Yet, it is as widely esteemed by practical people, "mere men of business," one might say. To put it crudely, BCA is approved of more generally by those that live in the world but is apt to be disparaged by those of a philosophic mind who see it as ". . . a lust for mechanical objectivity." 1 Mechanical objectivity, however, is a view from which BCA has moved.
BCA properly is an art form embodying elements of law, morality, judgment, and science. It is a method of structuring conversation and organizing knowledge. It is not a maxim, nor can it be acceptably reduced to mechanical objectivity. To recognize BCA as partly reductionist is not to prove it without value, nor without the flexibility to adapt to change. As a method it is necessarily reductionist, but reductionist sciences have proven to be very powerful. 2 The test of a method is whether it is useful, and BCA undeniably has been, 3 notwithstanding claims to the contrary. 4 This paper contributes to the process of attaining greater uniformity of principles and standards within BCA. Practitioners and critics alike are sometimes unclear precisely what they mean when they speak of BCA, as there is no one uniform method or concept. Toward this end, I will briefly consider the benefit-cost principle, the considerations that lie behind it and criticisms that have been made of it in light of these considerations. In response to these criticisms, and to establish more clearly what BCA precisely is, I then describe a version of BCA that I call Ethical Benefit-Cost Analysis. I outline EBCA through establishing a set of rules -a meta-set of principles and standards to guide the practice of BCA. Finally, I show that in principle, this is both a superior version of efficiency and more accurately reflects our moral compass.
II. The Benefit-Cost Principle
Modern benefit-cost analysis arose out of discussions among prominent British economists during the late 1930s. 5 Before that time, it was generally assumed that each individual had an "equal capacity for enjoyment," and that gains and losses among different individuals could be directly compared. 6 Robbins challenged this view by arguing that interpersonal comparisons of utility were unscientific so that no such direct comparison could be made. 7 Kaldor acknowledged Robbins' point about the inability to make interpersonal utility comparisons on any scientific basis, but suggested it could be made irrelevant. 8 He suggested that, when a policy led to an increase in aggregate real income, …the economist's case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of the comparability of individual satisfaction, since in all such cases it is possible to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people better off without making anybody worse off. 9 Kaldor went on to note that whether compensation should take place "is a political question on which the economist, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion." 10 Hicks accepted this approach, 11 which came to be called the Kaldor-Hicks
Test (KH), or, more often, the Potential Compensation Test (PCT). The PCT has been the standard for benefit-cost analysis for some sixty years. Its original justification was to separate economic efficiency from equity so as to avoid interpersonal comparisons. As
Chipman and Moore 12 and Zerbe 13 have noted, this goal has not been achieved, nor
should it be, nor can it be, nor need it be.
In BCA, preferences for gains in the form of projects or goods are measured by the willingness to pay for them (WTP). For example, if we are considering reducing noise levels at an airport by requiring new mufflers on airplanes, we would, inter alia, ask residents near the airport how much they would be willing to pay to achieve a certain reduction in noise and compare this amount to the costs to the airline of installing the mufflers. 14 The preference to avoid losses (the cost) is measured by the willingness to accept payment to bear the loss (WTA). In the above example, airlines' WTA to avoid the cost is represented by the costs to the airlines of installing the mufflers. When the overall preference for obtaining a good is greater than the overall preference to avoid 9 Id. 10 Id. It was thought that politicians or non-economists should make judgments and decisions about income distribution effects. 11 J.R. Hicks would take judgments about the distribution of benefits and losses out of the hands of economists and put them into the political process. From an economist's perspective, this would make BCA more "scientific."
The WTP and WTA reflect time preferences -e.g. the difference between how much right now I value fifty dollars you give me today weighed against how much I value fifty dollars you will give me a year from now -through the use of a discount rate.
BCA is thus reduced to the simple formula of comparing the discounted value of the gains and losses as follows:
(1) NPV = Where Bjt are benefits for person j measured in time t as measured by the willingness to pay, Cjt are costs to person j in time t measured by the willingness to accept payment, r is the discount rate and T is time period of the project's effects. 15 The 
III. Criticisms of the Benefit-Cost Principle
The criticisms of BCA are wide-ranging, frequent and repetitious. They are embodied mainly in academic legal-philosophical literature, and appear motivated by the increasing use of BCA in decision-making, by the encroachment of economic thinking into law, and by the attraction of easy criticisms, given the absence of clearly defined foundational values for BCA. 16 Much of the critical literature is not aimed at improving the practice of BCA, or at identifying deficiencies of particular analyses. Rather, it critiques the foundational deficiencies of BCA, i.e., it criticizes the use of BCA itself. Suppose all goods are normal (not inferior) and that there are two persons or groups, 1 and 2, and two states of the world, A and B. By definition, for a normal good for a single individual, the absolute value of the WTA exceeds the WTP, i.e. I must be paid more to give something up than I will pay to acquire it. MISHAN, supra note 6. The letters a,b,c,d in Table 3 represent abstract WTP and WTA values for a given good, and are assumed to be absolute values: The issues that garner criticism for BCA also contribute to its practice being an art form. In the sections below, I describe this art form, and clarify rules for its ethical and practical use.
IV. Ethical Benefit-Cost Analysis: The Art Form
By art form, I mean to describe a procedure that relies on nuanced judgment. The With inferiority, a > d by assumption, a > b by inferiority, and c > d by inferiority. From this, we can make no conclusion about whether or not c is greater or less d; that is, c > = < b, so reversal could occur but it need not occur. This shows that inferiority is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a Scitovsky reversal. 32 Elsewhere I show how these deficiencies in BCA arose from the mistaken attempt to eliminate interpersonal comparisons of utility in the early development of economic BCA. The role of BCA is to suggest marginal improvements given the existing pattern of rights. 38 The definition of WTP and WTA rests on law. The WTA payment presupposes a right to some status quo position from which losses are to be counted. 37 Some critics start from an apparent dislike of markets and simply extend this dislike to benefitcost as an approach that mimics markets. Economists on their part are often reluctant to recognize the normative nature of their discipline when applied to policy. 38 The law will determine whether WTP or WTA will be used. The law will be the major determinant of psychological reference points. Even if the economic standard is psychological ownership, the psychological point of view and the law will correspond to each other and to the sociological point of view. 42 The assumption is that a choice based on assigned legal entitlements is correct because of the correspondence between the legal and psychological states; it is not correct or incorrect as a matter of economic principle.
Economic efficiency in the KHM form would recognize the psychological status quo as primary and change ownership to conform to it. As a matter of practice, the relevant psychological reference point cannot be just that of the individual but rather must be that of society generally. Insofar as the law embodies the general understanding, the law should govern. The underlying basis is the general psychological reference point. Where this reference point differs from the law, it furnishes a guide for further development of the law, as indeed it has done with the development of common law. Rule Two: Not everyone's preferences need to be measured in practice, but all should be considered.
The traditional economic view is that everyone's preferences count. 53 This arises from economic theory in which all preferences count, and is consistent with a democratic point of view and the ethos of benefit-cost analysis. Economic welfare theory, however, typically assumes away transactions costs so that preferences are assumed to be determined at no cost.
A preferred approach is to recognize that everyone's preferences count in the sense that they need to be considered but they do not need always to be measured. To do so would be inefficient -no BCA will measure all affected preferences; it is too expensive. What is required is to reasonably measure significant preferences, to acknowledge preferences not measured, and to consider whether or not unmeasured preferences are likely to contradict the formulaic BCA test. These elements are required by reasonable principles and standards for BCA. consider effects of its projects on another municipality. A state, unless required by law, will not usually consider effects on another state, and so forth. In fact, government BCAs often do not even fully consider, and sometimes do not consider at all, their own constituents' preferences in a project. Where significant preferences are ignored, or not considered, BCAs must be considered as politically constrained, and as not conforming to the highest principles and standards for BCA. Of course, this does not mean such analyses are not useful.
Rule Three: Better informed individual preferences are preferred to less informed.
Preferences may differ over time, by knowledge and by contemplation. The following example is given by Frank: 58 Cornell University has two sets of faculty tennis courts, one outdoor, the other indoor. Membership in the outdoor is available for a fixed fee per season. There is no additional charge. . . . The indoor facility, by contrast has not only a seasonal fee, but also a $15 per hour charge for court time. . . .The indoor facility opens in early October, a time when the Ithaca weather can be anything from bright sunshine and mild temperatures to blowing sleet and snow. The outdoor courts remain open . . . until early November. There is a similar 1-month overlap in the . . . spring. . . .
Having [paid for the indoor court] they must pay for the hour whether or not they use it. During good weather, almost everyone prefers to play on the outdoor courts. . . .
Here is the problem: You are committed to an indoor court at 3 p.m. on Saturday, October 20, the only hour you are free to play that day. It is a warm, sunny autumn afternoon. Where should you play, indoors or outdoors?
I find that surprising many of my noneconomist [sic] partners balk when I say that playing on the outdoor courts is the only sensible thing to do. "But we've already paid for the indoor, they invariably complain. I ask, "If both courts cost the same, which would you choose?" They immediately respond, "Outdoors.", I then explain that both courts do cost the same -because our fee for the hour is going to be $15 no matter which lace we play -indeed, no matter whether we play at all. The $15 is a sunk cost and should have no effect on our decision. Yet, even at this point, many people seem to feel uncomfortable about wasting the indoor court we have paid for. The alternative, however, is to waste an opportunity to play outdoors, which we all agree is something even more valuable! . . . Eventually, most people come around to the notion that it is more sensible to abandon the indoor court. . . We would conclude (assuming Frank didn't bully his colleagues) that the correct choice in a BCA context is to play outdoors and that the additional preference over playing outdoors rather than indoors is a measure of this preference. Not all people were persuaded by Frank, only "most," however, so that for some people the avoidance of the feeling of waste engendered by playing outdoors is of sufficient negative value that they should play indoors. For these people the additional value of playing outdoors only applies when one has not already paid for playing indoors.
Informed preferences are not at all the same as expertise. Expertise is clearly not the aim of requirements that adults be informed as when, for example, when they consent to medical procedures. Expertise is often hard won, for example requiring about 10,000 hours of relevant experience in chess, violin or tennis. 59 I shall say that informed preferences are created when the respondent has a reasonable understanding of probable consequences of alternative actions. This is a higher standard than is often imposed in product liability, community right-to know, and medical practices where the standard is closer to information about the largest or most severe possible consequences of a choice but not always information about their probability of occurrence. 60 Preference may be created or informed by experts. It is well established that preferences change with knowledge. 61 A reasonable assumption is that people would prefer to use their preferences where they are informed by knowledge than when they are not since when knowledgeable, their previous uninformed preferences are still available, but are no longer preferred.
Scholars in the field of psychology argue that, without good information, individuals and groups often make bad decisions when faced with complex issues involving uncertainties and value tradeoffs. 62 McDaniels, Gregory and Fields, prominent scholars in the field of public affairs, show that public involvement in decisions that involve risk tradeoffs is more successful when the participants are well informed about the technicalities of the decision. 63 Experiments show that, in situations where laypersons are not likely to fully understand all of the details of the risk related to the decision, a group participation process should be designed. 64 The participation process should allow for the decision-makers to be educated about the risks involved in the decision through informational sessions. However, their consensus should be based on their own established hierarchy of values. 65 These insights provided by scholars in psychology and public policy lead to the conclusion that the results of public participation in decisions involving risk assessment can be ameliorated by including well-conducted BCAs in the citizen participation process.
Rule Four. Expert opinion is better than uninformed preference.
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It follows reasonably from Rule Three that uninformed people will prefer the preferences of experts when they can assume that the preferences of experts would lie closer to their own informed preferences than to their uninformed preferences. There is considerable literature on the differences between expert and lay opinion. 67 Bostrom notes that despite the numerous value judgments and biases that can influence expert risk assessments, such assessments are nevertheless based, ideally, on specialized information the average lay person is unlikely to know or have the resources to acquire:
"Knowledge about relative frequencies, causal mechanisms, and information sources often enables experts to make predictions about risky processes that are much more reliable than uninformed judgments. Most of us would rather not try to do for ourselves the jobs we usually delegate to experts, such as nuclear engineers, doctors, auto mechanics -or even lawyers." There is a conflict between scientific views of risk assessment and views that emphasize the cultural and personal aspects. For example, to reduce the discretion of experts, the EPA has attempted to develop "generic guidelines" that apply to all substances. These constitute a set of standards such as the following: no thresholds in dose-response functions, assume linearity in dose response functions at low doses, cumulative lifetime exposure as measure of dose, and so forth. Pollak notes, however, that science does not resolve the issue of whether or not these rules are appropriate.
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Breyer has suggested a bureaucratic structure to rationalize risk regulation across fields.
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But, Pollak notes, rationality in the form of "scientifically determined" guidelines is not attainable. Rationalizing procedures and standards leads to procedures that are less subjective. More importantly, it is possible to achieve "procedural objectivity" by reducing discretion. I would add that in the long run, standards can lead to better decisions as they create pressure to improve the standards. Similarly, this approach can be a means to think about ways to bring credible reassurance to the public. The use of expert opinion in civil and criminal trials illustrates how expert opinion is valued over uninformed lay opinion. Expert testimony is allowed where scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue. 74 If it is a matter a layperson can understand without the help of an expert witness, an expert witness will not be allowed. Through the use of expert witnesses at trial, the legal system supports the notion that informed expert opinion is valued over uninformed lay opinion.
Rule Five. Where expert opinion differs from informed public sentiment, it is public sentiment that is relevant.
It is well established that lay preferences, even if informed, will differ from expert preferences. In fact, informed public preferences often seem more nuanced and less narrow.
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In BCA public preferences are desired over the preferences of experts. than just the severity of the event and the uncertainty associated with that event. 77 Interactions between human activities and their consequences are more complex and unique than the interactions accounted for by the average probabilities used in technical risk analyses. 78 Researchers conclude that risk perceptions are supported by sets of consistent beliefs, not just irrational fears and unbridled emotions.
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In the tennis example offered by Frank above, there are informed people who nevertheless prefer to play tennis indoors -presumably to avoid the sentiment of waste.
The fact is that people often appear to not treat sunk costs as irrelevant -the expert recommendation -due to the desire to avoid the sensation of waste. In such cases where the respondent is informed, preferences should be taken as they lie.
The use of expert witnesses at trial is also illustrative of this rule that informed lay opinion will be valued over expert opinion. Ultimately, in any jury trial, it is the jury's decision to decide whether and to how much to value an expert's testimony. 80 The same is true for the judge in a bench trial. Many trials feature opposing expert witnesses, ensuring that the now-informed lay people's opinion has precedence over at least that of one expert. Such sentiments as envy, hatred, jealousy, malice, sadism, or the rewards of thievery or murder need not count in a BCA by the requirements of efficiency itself.
Where there is law forbidding behavior this may be taken as an indication that social sentiments are strongly against giving weight to the behavior. These anti-sentiments count as well. In the absence of law, sufficient social custom may in turn be taken to provide the same result. Thus a balancing of sentiments in these cases suggests that, where law and custom dictate, those sentiments that reflect social opprobrium are outweighed and should be ignored.
As an illustration, consider this example: 81 Amartya, a rich man, steals a book from Derek, a poor man. Derek, who loves his book, sues for its return and costs. Derek would be willing to pay $10 for the book, but would sell it to Amartya for $15. Amartya, who cares very little for the book, would pay $20 for it, but would sell it for $22.50. At trial, a benefit-cost analyst hired by Amartya testifies that the book has more value to Amartya, because his willingness to pay exceeds Derek's. BCA would seem to suggest that giving the book to Amartya is wealth-maximizing. The Court, however, finds that because the book was stolen, it should be returned to Derek, regardless of the BCA analysis. Essentially, here, where there is a law against stealing, Amartya's WTP is outweighed by social sentiment, and therefore loses. Rule 6 then recommends, for example, that the value of the stolen goods to do not count to the thief. 81 Zerbe, Three Rules, supra, note 48. This example is based on a re-working of an example offered by Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 191, 197 (1980) .
Rule Seven: Where law and custom offer no guide then all preferences are to be counted.
Rule Seven is ancillary to Rule Six. That is, where the discussion concerned whether or not theft should be illegal then thieves would have standing. This is because there is no prior understanding of a right to protection against thievery. Where the issue is the relative weight of the sentiment itself in order to decide whether or nor theft should be illegal, then thieves'sentiments should be counted.
In situations where rights are undetermined the correct measure for BCA is the WTP, the payment to gain a right since there is not ownership of the right. That is, unowned goods should be sold at auction. Where rights are partial and in dispute, the correct measure of efficiency is determined by a combination of WTP and WTA of the various parties. Elsewhere I have determined the particular weight to be given to the WTP and WTA according the benefit-cost principle in these circumstances. ZERBE, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, supra note 13. 83 Though poorer women seeking to terminate a pregnancy may not be able to pay as much as wealthier women (and thus have a lower WTP, since WTP is finite and based on actual ability to pay), the Court's balancing aggregate WTP and WTA in these situations includes the moral sentiments of others and society. In essence, society's WTP to ensure access and equality to a right once established compensates for an individual's ability to pay. 84 90 Zerbe argues that the correlation between changes in the common law and efficiency is stronger when a measure of efficiency is used that includes moral sentiments. 91 Thus an explanation of common law tendencies utilizing ethical BCA is enhanced by attention to issues of distribution and other ethical considerations. Schorr has found that considerations of distributive justice have played an important role in the evolution of property rights. 92 Zerbe and Anderson found that fairness played an important role in the creation of rights in the California gold fields after 1848. 93 Larry
Goulder recently suggested an approach that incorporates important elements of the KHM framework. 94 Ethical BCA using KHM codifies what has to a considerable extent been occurring in practice. 95 For example, the heightened environmental movement starting in the 1970s has lead to legal common law approaches focused on fairness, as well as efficiency. In the famous case of Boomer, the highest New York state court found a private nuisance but forbore to either offer the traditional injunctive relief or to leave plaintiffs uncompensated.
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The consideration of moral sentiments holds lessons for the importance of process in determining benefits and costs. Lesbirel 97 shows empirically that an offer of monetary compensation has a positive influence on an individual's support for a site, but that higher levels of compensation do not produce an additional increase in support. In other words, the level of compensation is not as important as compensation in principle.
Rule 9: Ethical sentiments are to be counted directly and not included in the discount rate.
There has been very considerable criticism on moral or ethical grounds of BCA's discounting of future benefits and costs. Many critics would use discount rates of zero.
To combine ethical preferences with the discount rate combines two disparate things, ethical preferences and the social opportunity cost of resources.
As soon as you use a discount rate that is lower than the actual time preference of those affected, you distort the choice between projects with shorter and longer time periods. This distortion will result in smaller benefits or larger costs so that net benefits First, the costs of compensating are clearly not $0.017 million. The administrative costs of providing compensation so far into the future must be included, and these may well be 99 Under KH, compensation costs are hypothetical and are merely the present value of the costs of future harm, or $0.017 billion. 100 The relevant amount of compensation here is not the amount actually required for those injured to be fully compensated, rather, it is the amount of compensation the current generation thinks is correct. This information is likely obtainable through a contingent valuation survey to determine, at least in principle, the WTP 105 The assumption of declining marginal utility of income with increasing income applies to distributional effects in general, as well as to short-term rates, and not just to long-term discount rates. If there is a declining marginal utility of income, then the benefits accruing to the wealthy should receive less weight. Taking into account the effect of declining marginal utility of income with wealth are better done directly through valuations of benefits and costs rather than by changes in the discount rate. That is current users can account both for their own sentiments for future generation as well as their probable increase in wealth. Attempting to use the discount rate to account for either of these can result in the wrong project choice. 106 See Kunreuther and Easterling, supra note 97, at 252, 255; See Svenson and Karlsson, supra note 104, at 385. Again, it is not the amount of compensation actually required for those injured that is directly relevant here. Rather, it is the amount of compensation the current generation thinks is correct. This information could be determined, at least in principle, by a contingent valuation survey measuring the WTP or WTA of those who have ethical considerations about the project.
Rule 10: The purpose of BCA is to furnish information to the decision process and not to make the decision.
BCA is, however, not to be separated from political discourse so that its use raises the question of whether or not it can enhance such discussion. 107 In this regard, the most cogent criticism is that in attempting to portray preferences, 
VI. Conclusion
Modern benefit-cost analysis has been mischaracterized by a wide spectrum of non-practitioner, mainly legal critics. Economists and users or producers of BCA in the past have chosen to remain unaware of the need to make the foundation of benefit-cost analysis clear. Yet economists have come to realize or been forced by practicality (e.g. in addressing issues of charity, and through environmental evaluation and contingent valuation where moral sentiments play a role), to see that a more inclusive view of BCA allows a wider scope for evaluations, and a more solid framework for its use. As part of the process of making the basis for BCA clearer and more useful, this article begins to develop rules and standards of practice. In doing this it shows that BCA is not a mechanical exercise but rather an art form involving nuanced judgment about what information is most useful for public policy.
In introducing ethical BCA as an art form, most criticisms of BCA are obviated. Table 2 shows briefly the criticism and the response of ethical BCA. These responses are then shown to be governed by one or more of the rules for ethical BCA introduced here. 
